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**Report to NEKTAN**
**NEKTAN RNG**

Report Reference ID	Jurisdiction	Issue Date
NMI/128/012/MLT/MGA/01	Malta	31/03/2015

**Executive Summary**

This report summarises the testing of NEKTAN's Random Number Generator (RNG).

The RNG submission consisted of a virtual machine (VM) and a single Java file containing an implementation of Java's `SecureRandom` class (`java.security.SecureRandom`), running under Java 1.8.0\_11 (JDK 8).

In order to assess the suitability of the RNG for the purpose of supplying data to games, data for the following representative ranges were drawn:

- 0 - 36 (for Roulette games)
- 0 - 51 (for single card deck outcomes)
- 0 - 127 (for slot game outcomes)

`SecureRandom` is generally-accepted to be cryptographically-secure provided (a) it is configured correctly, and (b) sufficient system entropy is available for its operation.

The RNG has been assessed for compliance with the Malta Gaming Authority's Subsidiary Legislation 438.04: Remote Gaming Regulations (Legal Notice 176 of 2004, as amended by Legal Notices 110 of 2006, 270 and 426 of 2007, and 90 of 2011). Our assessment methods included statistical analysis of the RNG outputs and source code review.

No issues are raised. The RNG is deemed suitable for deployment in the jurisdiction of Malta.

Aled Hughes  
Laboratory Manager

**Disclaimer**

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## Introduction

NMi UK is approved to provide testing services relating to online gaming by the UK Gambling Commission, the Alderney Gambling Control Commission (AGCC), the Isle of Man Gambling Supervision Commission (GSC), the Jersey Gambling Commission, the Spanish National Gambling Commission (CNJ), the Government of Gibraltar Licensing Authority, the Malta Gaming Authority (MGA), Loto-Quebec and the British Columbia Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch (GPEB).

For a full list of NMi's accreditations (including details of all land-based and i-gaming regulatory approvals), please see <http://www.nmi.nl/organisation/accreditationsgaming>.

## Caveats

The results presented in this document are a summary of the testing work undertaken, and this report is subject to a number of caveats, including:

- All items provided for inspection and/or testing are declared by the customer to be configured identically to those in commercial use, with the exception of operator-configurable aspects that will not have a bearing on game fairness or player returns.
- All software and source code provided for empirical testing and/or code review is declared by the customer to behave identically to the software and code in commercial use.
- Decisions taken by the supplied software in automatic test modes / simulators are reasonable emulations of those that would be expected to be taken by real players.

All efforts have been taken to ensure that the testing undertaken has been as exhaustive as necessary to demonstrate compliance or non-compliance. NMi UK takes on trust that all test items (including all hardware and software), all documentation and all communications are accurate, truthful, and that there is no intention to deceive or subvert the assessment of compliance.

## Quality Control

The monitoring of this testing project was the responsibility of NMi's Quality Manager and every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this report. If errors or omissions are discovered, please contact us with details as soon as possible. NMi reserves the right to revise and reissue this Test Report if additional information is presented or discovered.

## Test Item Details

### Critical Components

SHA-1 checksum	File name
2217639a347a5d72004a732abd093bfff3a0f944e	RNGDistribution.class

## Testing Overview

### Customer Contacts

The customer liaisons were Jane Ryan, James Bloom and Matthew Mitchell.

### Dates

Testing was undertaken during the following periods:

- 27/03/2015 - 30/03/2015

### Locations

Testing was undertaken at the following locations:

- NMI UK, 1-3 Llys Helyg, Parc Menai, Bangor LL57 4EZ, UK.
- NMI, 530 - 4445 Lougheed Highway, Burnaby, British Columbia, V5C 0E4, Canada

### Applicable Standards

Conformance with the following standards has been assessed:

Document	Abbreviation Used
Malta Gaming Authority: Subsidiary Legislation 438.04: Remote Gaming Regulations (Legal Notice 176 of 2004, as amended by Legal Notices 110 of 2006, 270 and 426 of 2007, and 90 of 2011)	Malta

### Methods

Our assessment methods included statistical analysis of the RNG outputs and source code review.

# RNG Analysis

## Source code & dependencies

The RNG submission consisted of a virtual machine (VM) and a single Java file containing an implementation of Java's `SecureRandom` class (`java.security.SecureRandom`), running under Java 1.8.0\_11 (JDK 8).

`SecureRandom` is generally-accepted to be cryptographically-secure provided (a) it is configured correctly, and (b) sufficient system entropy is available for its operation. In this implementation it opens channels to `/dev/random/` and `/dev/urandom`; the former blocks if insufficient system entropy is available, the latter does not.

Under normal operating conditions in which sufficient system entropy is available, the outputs will be unpredictable without complete knowledge of the algorithm, its implementation, and the underlying system state.

## Empirical testing results

### Degrees of freedom

The following samples were generated:

- 3 sets of 3 million raw number between 0 and  $2^{32} - 1$  (inclusive)
- 1 set of 60 million raw number between 0 and  $2^{32} - 1$  (inclusive)
- 1 set of 60 million integers between 0 and 36 (inclusive)
- 1 set of 60 million integers between 0 and 51 (inclusive)
- 1 set of 60 million integers between 0 and 127 (inclusive)

### Tests under high load, with insufficient system entropy

Under high load, with limited system entropy available, failure patterns were detected.

### Tests under high load, with sufficient system entropy

Under high load, with sufficient system entropy available, no failures were detected. The results can be summarised as follows:

#### Analysis of 3 sets of 3 million unscaled 32-bit raw numbers

The numbers passed the Diehard Battery of tests, confirming that the software RNG is functioning correctly from a bitwise randomness perspective.

#### Analysis of 1 set of 60 million unscaled 32-bit raw number

The numbers passed the NIST Battery of tests, confirming that the software RNG is functioning correctly from a bitwise randomness perspective.

#### Analysis of 60 million scaled integers between 0 and 36 (inclusive)

The frequency of occurrences of the possible outcomes was as expected for a random distribution. The outcomes covered the full range of possibilities. No pairwise correlations were observed outside of the expectations for a random sample. No regular patterns or groupings were observed. The gaps between repetitions of outcomes were observed to be random.

#### Analysis of 60 million scaled integers between 0 and 51 (inclusive)

The frequency of occurrences of the possible outcomes was as expected for a random distribution. The outcomes covered the full range of possibilities. No pairwise correlations were observed outside of the expectations for a random sample. No regular patterns or groupings were observed. The gaps between repetitions of outcomes were observed to be random.

#### Analysis of 60 million scaled integers between 0 and 127 (inclusive)

The frequency of occurrences of the possible outcomes was as expected for a random distribution. The outcomes covered the full range of possibilities. No pairwise correlations were observed outside of the expectations for a

random sample. No regular patterns or groupings were observed. The gaps between repetitions of outcomes were observed to be random.

### **Conclusions**

Under high load, with limited system entropy available, failure patterns were detected, and therefore we recommend that the entropy of the containing system be monitored as a preventative measure.

Under normal operating conditions in which sufficient system entropy was available, the RNG outputs were determined to be acceptably random, unpredictable (even with full knowledge of the system and initial system state) and not reproducible.

## Appendix A: Requirements Met

<b>Reference:</b>	Malta / Third Schedule, Regulation 25, Technical requirement for gaming system (3.25:3, 3.25:3.a)
<b>Requirement:</b>	The gaming system must satisfy the following criteria for randomness, following Schneier: the data must be randomly generated, passing appropriate statistical tests of randomness;
<b>Assessment:</b> <i>Pass</i>	The data generated for the specified ranges passed the statistical tests applied.

<b>Reference:</b>	Malta / Third Schedule, Regulation 25, Technical requirement for gaming system (3.25:3, 3.25:3.b)
<b>Requirement:</b>	The gaming system must satisfy the following criteria for randomness, following Schneier: the data must be unpredictable, i.e. it must be computationally infeasible to predict what the next number will be, given complete knowledge of the algorithm or hardware generating the sequence, and all previously generated numbers;
<b>Assessment:</b> <i>Pass</i>	The RNG is an implementation of Java's SecureRandom algorithm. Under normal operating conditions, the outputs are unpredictable without complete knowledge of the algorithm, its implementation, and initial state.

<b>Reference:</b>	Malta / Third Schedule, Regulation 25, Technical requirement for gaming system (3.25:3, 3.25:3.c)
<b>Requirement:</b>	The gaming system must satisfy the following criteria for randomness, following Schneier: the series cannot be reliably reproduced, i.e. if the sequence generator is activated again with the same input (as exactly as is reasonably possible) it will produce two completely unrelated random sequences.
<b>Assessment:</b> <i>Pass</i>	If the RNG is activated again with the same input it will produce two completely unrelated random sequences.

**END OF REPORT**